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et al.: Right to Cross-Examine

RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
07

People v. Pereda20
(decided January 31, 1994)
Defendant claimed that his right to cross-examine was violated
when the trial court limited the cross-examination of a
complainant, despite the well-recognized fact that the defendant's
2008
right to cross-examine a witness was protected by Federal
and State2 009 Constitutions.
The reported facts of Pereda are sparse and vague. The
defendant, Pereda, was convicted in a jury trial of rape and
assault. 2010 Additionally, the court's decision leads the reader to
infer that the defendant was also involved with the complainants
in civil litigation, 20 11 and that Pereda's cross-examination issue
may have pertained to the interest that the complainants could
have had in the outcome of the criminal trial. 20 12 The court,
however, held that the latter issue was too remote to permit
13
cross-examination on the subject. 20
2007.

__

A.D.2d

_,

607 N.Y.S.2d 98 (2d Dep't 1994).

2008. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him....-).
2009. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("In any trial in any court whatever the party
accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in
civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
and be confronted with the witnesses against him .... ").
2010. Pereda,
2011. Id. at _,

_

607 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
A.D.2d at
607 N.Y.S.2d at 100. The court made reference to
_,

evidence in the jury's possession concerning civil lawsuits in which the
complainants were involved. Id.
, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
2012. Id. at
,607 N.Y.S.2d at 99-100. Aside from affirming the lower
2013. Id. at
court's limitation of defendant's cross-examination, the appellate court denied
the defendant's motion to suppress his post-arrest statements. Id. at

_,

607

N.Y.S.2d at 99. Additionally, the appellate court also denied his request for a
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The Pereda court agreed with the lower court's limitation on
the defendant's right to cross-examine, reasoning that "trial
courts retain wide discretion to limit cross-examination" 20 14 for
various concerns, such as when interrogation confuses the issues
or when it is only of minimal relevance. 20 15 The court also
explained that the issue of relevancy, or rather, whether the
evidence is too remote, "is a question for the court."' 20 16 In other
words, whether an issue is relevant is determined by the trial
judge, rather than the factfinders.
The basis of a defendant's right to cross-examine a witness is
found in both the United States Constitution and the New York
State Constitution, both of which confer the right to confront
witnesses who are testifying against a defendant. 20 17 This right,
however, is not necessarily absolute in its application, 20 18 and
the denial of confrontation does not automatically mandate
reversal of a defendant's conviction. 2 0 19

jury charge that the complainants were interested witnesses, stating that the
jury had already been appropriately charged and, in concluding, dismissed
Pereda's remaining contentions in light of his overwhelming guilt. Id. at
607 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
2014. Id. at
,607 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
_,

2015. Id. at

,607

N.Y.S.2d at 99.

2016. Id. at
,607 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
2017. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. and N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
2018. Pereda,

_

A.D.2d at -, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 99. The court stated that

cross-examination may be limited "'based on concerns about, among other
things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant."' (quoting
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)).
2019. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (holding that
the denial of cross-examination of a prosecution witness to show bias violated
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights subject to harmless-error analysis);
People v. Ashner, 190 A.D.2d 238, 246, 597 N.Y.S.2d 975, 980 (2d Dep't
1993) (holding that the lower court erred by limiting cross-examination of a
witness through the use of harmless-error analysis).
In People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 326 N.E.2d 787, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213
(1975), the New York Court of Appeals distinguished between the federal and
state tests for harmless error. The federal harmless-error test examines the
proof of the defendant's guilt and the effect the error had on the verdict. Id. at
241-43, 326 N.E.2d 793-94, 367 N.Y.S.2d 221-23. The New York harmlesserror test, however, which is applied to non-constitutional issues, places
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A recent New York case which synthesized federal and state
precedent on the right to cross-examination is People v.
Ashner,2 0 20 in which the defendant successfully appealed her
conviction of grand larceny and 25 counts of forgery because
there was a reasonable possibility that the court's limitation on
202 1
her right to cross-examine a witness led to her conviction.

One consideration, stated in Pereda, is whether the evidence
obtained through a cross-examination is too remote. 2 0 2 2 In
People v. Feldman,2 0 2 3 the court reversed a conviction where the

defendant was prevented from discrediting an expert witness'
statements. 20 2 4 The court held that the question of "[w]hether

is

evidence

'too

remote'

. . .

is

a

question

for

the

court .... "2025 Feldman is but one of five New York state cases
the Pereda court cites in support of its decision to uphold the
2026
limitation placed on the defendant's right to cross-examine.

The other cases equally support the premise that if testimony or
evidence is too remote or conjectural, the court may limit the
2 027
cross-examination concerning that testimony or evidence.
greater weight on the proof of the defendant's guilt - which can render an error
harmless where a defendant's guilt is overwhelming. Id. The Pereda court
points to the "overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt," Pereda, _
607 N.Y.S.2d at 100, but does so in relation to the defendant's
A.D.2d at
"remaining contentions," not referring to his right to cross-examine. Id.
2020. 190 A.D.2d 238, 597 N.Y.S.2d 975 (2d Dep't 1993) (holding that is
was not harmless error to limit cross-examination where there may have been
a motive to testify falsely).
,597 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
2021. d. at
607 N.Y.S.2d at 99-100; see also JEROME
2022. Pereda, __ A.D.2d at
PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE 117 (10th ed. 1973) ("Evidence, although
technically relevant, will be excluded if it is too slight, remote, or conjectural
to have any legitimate influence in determining the fact in issue. And the
question whether the evidence is of such nature is for the court, not for the
jury. ").
2023. 299 N.Y. 153, 85 N.E.2d 913 (1949).
2024. Id. at 169-70, 85 N.E.2d at 921.
2025. Id. at 169, 85 N.E.2d at 921.
2026. Pereda, __ A.D.2d at _, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
2027. See People v. Williams, 188 A.D.2d 382, 383, 591 N.Y.S.2d 390,
391 (1st Dep't 1992) ("Defendant's theory - that the mother, under the
influence of hallucinations, persuaded her daughter to fabricate charges against
_,
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Consistent with the New York court's interpretation, the
United States Supreme Court, in People v. Gordon,202 8 held that
"this principle [of wide judicial discretion to control crossexamination] cannot be expanded to justify a curtailment which
keeps from the jury relevant and important facts bearing on the
2029
trustworthiness of crucial testimony. "
Another common consideration made in determining the trial
court's discretion in limiting cross-examination, as noted in Davis
v. Alaska,2030 is whether a witness was possibly motivated to
testify falsely against the defendant, which is weighed against the
value of the testimony. 203 1 In Davis, the juvenile witness had a
history of burglary, 20 32 and the court theorized that the stolen
safe, which authorities had found near the witness' stepfather's
house, might have caused the witness to testify falsely to avoid
2033
being named a suspect himself.
Davis is an often-cited case which supports the right of a
defendant to cross-examine the witnesses against him. In Davis,
the court stated:
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right of
an accused in a criminal prosecution "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." This right is secured for defendants in
state as well as federal criminal proceedings. (citation omitted)
him - was speculative and conjectural . . . ."); People v. Arthur,
661, 663, 588 N.Y.S.2d 881, 883 (2d Dep't 1992) (stating
discretion to limit defendant's cross-examination upheld when
theory that police were under pressure to arrest him was

186 A.D.2d
that court's
defendant's
a "remote

extrapolation"); People v. Frejomil, 184 A.D.2d 524, 525, 584 N.Y.S.2d 181,

182 (2d Dep't 1992) (holding that court's limitation on defendant's crossexamination of his wife in regard to collateral matters was reasonable); People
v. Martinez, 177 A.D.2d 600, 601, 575 N.Y.S.2d 938, 939 (2d Dep't 1991)

(holding that it was proper to limit defendant's right to cross-examine because
defendant's theory that victim's mother might have unconsciously
communicated her suspicion that her daughter was having a sexual relationship
with defendant was too speculative).
2028. 344 U.S. 414, 423 (1952).

2029. Id. at 423.
2030. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).

2031. Id. at 311.
2032. Id.
2033. Id. at 310-14.
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Confrontation means more than being allowed to confront the
witness physically. "Our cases construing the [confrontation]
clause hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of
cross-examination. "2034
The purpose of cross-examining a witness is to put before the
2035
jury the facts from which it may infer the witness' reliability.
In conclusion, Pereda's right to confront the witness against
him was protected by Federal and State Constitutions under the
Confrontation Clause of each, but the right is not absolute and
can be limited by the discretion of the court depending on
whether the court views the testimony as too remote and whether
an appeal based on a violation of that right to cross-examine will
be viewed as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2034. Id. at 353; see also People v. Ashner, 190 A.D.2d 238, 597 N.Y.S.2d
975 (2d Dep't 1993) ("The right of cross-examination is included in the federal
and state constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against
her.").
2035. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986).
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